But first, some background. Most of China's internet connects to the rest of the world through what's known in the rest of the world as "the Great Firewall of China". Similar to network firewalls used for most corporate intranets, the Great Firewall is used as a tool to control and monitor internet communications in and out of China. Websites that are deemed politically sensitive are blocked from view inside China. This blocking has been used against obscure and prominent websites alike. The New York Times, Google, Facebook and Twitter have all been blocked by the firewall.
When web content is unencrypted, it can be scanned at the firewall for politically sensitive terms such as "June 4th", a reference to the Tiananmen Square protests, and blocked at the webpage level. China is certainly not the only entity that does this; many school systems in the US do the same sort of thing to filter content that's considered inappropriate for children. Part of my motivation for working on the "Library Digital Privacy Pledge" is that I don't think libraries and publishers who provide online content to them should be complicit in government censorship of any kind.
Last March, however China's Great Firewall was associated with an offensive attack. To put it more accurately, software co-located with China's Great Firewall turned innocent users of unencrypted websites into attack weapons. The targets of the attack were "GreatFire.org", a website that works to provide Chinese netizens a way to evade the surveillance of the Great Firewall, and GitHub.com, the website that hosts code for hundreds of thousand of programmers, including those supporting Greatfire.org.
Here's how the Great Cannon operated In August, Bill Marczak and co-workers from Berkeley, Princeton and Citizen Lab presented their findings on the Great Cannon at the 5th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet.
The Great Cannon acted as a "man-in-the-middle"[*] to intercept the communications of users outside china with servers inside china. Javascripts that collected advertising and usage data for Baidu, the "Chinese Google", were replaced with weaponized javascripts. These javascripts, running in the browsers of internet users outside China, then mounted the denial-of-service attack on Greatfire.org and Github.China was not the first to weaponized unencrypted internet traffic. Marczak et. al. write:
Our findings in China add another documented case to at least two other known instances of governments tampering with unencrypted Internet traffic to control information or launch attacks—the other two being the use of QUANTUM by the US NSA and UK’s GCHQ.[reference] In addition, product literature from two companies, FinFisher and Hacking Team, indicate that they sell similar “attack from the Internet” tools to governments around the world [reference]. These latest findings emphasize the urgency of replacing legacy web protocols like HTTP with their cryptographically strong counterparts, such as HTTPS.It's worth thinking about how libraries and the resources they offer might be exploited by a man-in-the-middle attacker. Science journals might be extremely useful in targeting espionage scripts at military facilities, for example. A saboteur might alter reference technical information used by a chemical or pharmaceutical company with potentially disastrous consequences. It's easy to see why any publisher that wants its information to be perceived as reliable has no choice but to start encrypting their services now.
The unencrypted services of public libraries are attractive targets for other sorts of mischief, ironically because of their users' trust in them and because they have a reputation for protecting privacy. Think about how many users would enter their names, phone numbers, and last four digits of their social security numbers if a library website seemed to ask for it. When a website is unencrypted, it's possible for "man-in-the-middle" attacks to insert content into an unencrypted web page coming from a library or other trusted website. An easy way for an attacker to get into position to execute such an attack is to spoof a wifi network, for example in a cafe or other public space, such as a library. It doesn't help if only a website's login is encrypted if an attacker can easily insert content into the unencrypted parts of the website.
To be clear, we don't know that libraries and the type of digital resources they offer are being targeted for weaponization, espionage or other sorts of mischief. Unfortunately, the internet offers a target-rich environment of unencrypted websites.
I believe that libraries and their suppliers need to move swiftly to take the possibility off the table and help lead the way to a more secure digital environment for us all.
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