Friday, May 17, 2019

RA21: Technology is not the problem.

RA21 vows to "improve access to institutionally-provided information resources". The barriers to access are primarily related to the authorization of such access in the context of licensing agreements. In a perfect world, trust and consensus between licensors and licensing communities would render authorization technology irrelevant. In the real world, technological controls need to build upon good-faith agreements and the consent of community members. Also in the real world, poorly implemented technology erodes that good-faith and consent.

The RA21 draft recommended practice focuses on technology and technology implementations, all the while failing to consider how to build the trust that underpins good-faith and consent. Service providers need to trust that identity providers faithfully facilitate authorized users and that the communities that identity providers serve will adhere to licensing agreements; users of information resources need to trust that their usage data will not be tracked and sold to the highest bidder.

Trust is not created out of thin air and certainly not by software. Technology can provide tools that facilitate trust, but shared values and communication between parties is the raw material of trust. An effective program to improve access must include processes and procedures that develop shared values and promote cooperation.

I recognize that RA21 has chosen to consider only the authentication intercourse as in-scope. But the draft recommendation has identified several areas of "further work". Included in this further work should be areas where community standards and best practices can enhance trust around authentication and authorization. To name two examples:
  1. A set of best practices around "incident response" would in practice work much better than a "guiding principle" of "end-to-end traceability".
  2. A set of best practices around auditing of security and privacy procedures and technology at service providers and identity providers would materially address the privacy and security concerns that the draft recommendation punts over to cited reports and studies.

This is the fifth and last of my comments submitted as part of the NISO standards process. The 102+ comments that have been submitted so far represent a great deal of expertise and real-world experience. My previous comments were  about secure communication channels, potential phishing attacks, the incompatibility of the recommended technical approach with privacy-enhancing browser features, and the need for radical inclusiveness. I've posted the comments here so you can easily comment.

Update July 22, 2019:



RA21's official response to this comment is:
We agree that technology is not the primary problem. There are two core issues that RA21 is seeking to address - firstly the current user experience of federated authentication needs to be improved, and this comprises the bulk of our recommendations. Secondly, considerable trust has been established between identity providers and service providers through their mutual particpation in identity federations and we are recommending broader particpation in identity federations where they do not exist. The understanding and acceptance of this trust model is not universal among all stakeholder groups particularly withing IdP organisations and through ongoing dialog and outreach during the implementation phase, RA21 hopes to address this deficit. Finally, we have added a section to the recommendations addressing security incident response and adoption of an operational security baseline by particpants.
OK.

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